Using a sample of unscheduled stock options granted to CEOs of large Canadian firms, we find reliable evidence of option grants manipulation. Our results show that the introduction of the two-day filing requirement following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) has eliminated backdating practice by Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. stock market. Further, we find that SOX has altered the way Canadian domestic firms manipulate stock option grants. Most importantly, we find that cross-listed firms are likely to set stock option grants in harmony with the day-of-theweek effect. Our study suggests that Canadian regulators should at least adopt the SEC-initiated change and should also introduce new regulations that enhance the monitoring role of board of directors.
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of earnings manipulation scandals and criticisms of excessive compensation packages in major firms such as Enron and WorldCom, executive stock options continue to be a much discussed topic. Recently, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has launched an investigation of several American companies on suspicion that they have been manipulating their stock option grants prices. As of September 4, 2007 about 130 public
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Street Journal).
2 The stock option grants scandal that has swept through the United States has prompted a similar investigation in Canada. In fact, following the U.S. SEC, the Ontario Security Commission (OSC) has announced that it is investigating the stock option awards practices of several Canadian companies, while many other firms have launched their own internal investigations (McKenna, 2006) . Although Canadian regulation with respect to stock option awards is considered to be tougher than in the U.S., we do not know to what extent, if any, this regulation would deter Canadian CEOs from manipulating their stock option awards. Lie (2005) was the one who prompted those investigations, yet Yermack (1997) was the first to point out the issue of stock-option manipulation by opportunistic managers, showing that stock prices exhibit positive abnormal returns immediately after a CEO option grant date. Yermack interprets his findings as CEOs opportunistically timing stock-option grants to benefit from
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2 The investment and media community has also started their own investigations and have uncovered numerous cases of backdating, forcing several executives to resign (see for instance Forelle and Bandler, 2006, and Bandler and Scannell, 2006) . pattern around stock options grants. Heron and Lie (2007) investigate this issue and find that backdating explains most of the abnormal returns pattern around stock option grant dates. Heron and Lie (2006) report that 23.0% of unscheduled CEOs stock options granted before the two-day filing requirement that took effect on August 29, 2002, were backdated or otherwise manipulated and 10.0% afterward.
Another stream of studies looks at the underlying causes of backdating practice in the U.S and show that weaker corporate governance encourages opportunistic and powerful CEOs to engage in such rent extraction behavior. For instance, Collins, Gong and Li (2007) show that backdating firms are more likely to have boards dominated by dependent and gray directors, a higher proportion of outside directors appointed by the incumbent CEO, and higher incidence of the CEO serving also as a chairman of the board. Bizjak, Lemmon and Whitby (2007) and Collins, Gong and Li (2007) suggest that interlocking boards play a major role in the spreading of the backdating practice across U.S. public firms. Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer (2006) find that the
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directors' option grants. Lie (2006, 2007) document evidence of backdating even after the endorsement of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which emerged to fix several critical deficiencies in the U.S. corporate governance practices, including the stock option grant manipulation.
The widespread practice of backdating in the U.S. stock market and the fact that CEOs manage
WR H[WUDFW SULYDWH EHQHILWV LQ D OHJDO V\VWHP NQRZQ WR RIIHU WKH ZRUOG ¶V EHVW SURWHFWLRQ RI
VKDUHKROGHUV ¶ ULJKWV UDLVHV VHYHUDO LPSRUWDQW TXHVWLRQV WKDW DUH QRW DGGUHVVHG LQ the extant literature. For instance, is backdating restricted to U.S. firms or it is also a common practice among other public firms around the world? Is backdating more prevalent in countries with a weaker legal system and corporate governance? Do foreign firms that choose to cross-list on the U.S. stock market engage in backdating practices? If yes, did they stop doing so after the twoday filing requirement took effect?
To answer these questions, we examined stock options grants using a sample of large Canadian public firms. Canadian regulations and corporate governance provide weaker protection of shareholders ¶ rights than do those of the U.S. Moreover, Canadian securities represent the largest group of stocks listed in the U.S. from a single country where they are listed as ordinary shares whereas European or Asian companies are usually listed as American Depository Receipts (Eun and Sabherwal, 2003) . Section two provides further details showing the importance of choosing the Canadian context to examine the stock option grants manipulation.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the manipulation of option grants outside the U.S. context. Existing literature is built only on the U.S. market and hence does not tell whether such practice prevails also among public firms outside the U.S. If this turns out to be the case, then regulators will have to introduce effective measures to curb such corporate abuse.
Second, we add to the growing literature on the effect of cross-border listing on corporate practice by examining stock options granted to CEOs of Canadian firms listed on both Canadian and U.S. stock exchanges. The extant literature shows that cross-listing of foreign firms in U.S.
VWRFNH[FKDQJHVHQKDQFHVWKHSURWHFWLRQRIPLQRULW\LQYHVWRUVLQFUHDVHVDQDO\VWV ¶IROORZLQJRID
ILUP ¶VVWRFNDQGconstrains the consumption of private benefits of control (Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004; Karolyi et al., 2007 and Sabherwal, 2007, among others Lie (2006, 2007) results suggest that the new SEC regulation has reduced but did not eliminate backdating in U.S. firms. Our analysis will show whether the new SEC regulation is effective in curbing backdating practice in cross-listed firms.
Third, we take a closer look at the timing of stock options after August 29, 2002 . The new legislation change should discourage backdating practices since the ability to backdate option grants on days where the stock price is low is substantially weakened. Given the new regulations, we argue that cross-listed firms will set grant dates consistent with the day-of-the-week effect.
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No study, to our knowledge, has examined whether CEOs target a particular day of the week to 3 Baker, Powell, and Weaver (1999) and Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) show that firms listed on the London
6WRFN([FKDQJHRU1HZ<RUN6WRFN([FKDQJH1<6(EHQHILWIURPDQLQFUHDVHLQYLVLELOLW\PHDVXUHGE\DQDO\VWV ¶
coverage. Reese and Weisbach (2002) , Doidge (2004) , Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) and Karolyi et al. (2007) show that cross-listing on U.S. stock exchanges reduces the consumption of private benefits by controlling shareholders.
set the grant date. There is abundant evidence that stock returns are statistically different across days of the week. If CEOs are manipulating stock option grant prices, they would probably set the grant date on the day where the stock market tends to be low and avoid the day on which the market is high. To test this hypothesis, we examine the day-of-the-week effect on the mean level for the S&P/TSX Canadian return index (using univariate and multivariate analyses). Once we identify the days on which the market returns are, on average, at their lowest and highest levels, we compute the percentage of stock options granted for each of the week-days. Evidence in support of this hypothesis is a significant contribution to the growing literature on manipulation
RI&(2V ¶VWRFNRSWLRQJUDQWV
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two motivates the choice of the Canadian stock market. Section three describes our sample and research methodology. Section four discusses our empirical findings and section five concludes the paper.
Why Canada?
The Canadian market presents a special case to examine potential manipulation of stock option grants. Canadian and the U.S. regulations differ in some important aspects with respect to stock option awards. For instance, since the end of 1999, Canadian firms are required to disclose stock option awards within 10 days of the grant date. Table 1 below presents the classification of option grants in our original sample. We can see that 85% of stock option awards are granted at-the-money while only 7.76% are granted out-of-the money. Interestingly, despite the fact that Canadian legislation prohibits companies from issuing in-the-money stock option grants, 6.32% of the grants in our original sample are in-the-money.
This clear violation of Canadian regulations raises concerns about the effectiveness of corporate governance in particular boards of directors to ensure that the issuer prices options appropriately and discloses them properly. This is consistent with high concentration of ownership and control that characterizes Canadian public firms. In fact, a large number of Canadian public firms are controlled by wealthy families where the CEO is also a member of the family. Results from Having only two business days to report stock options grants, cross-OLVWHG ILUPV ¶ DELOLW\ WR backdate has diminished after the SOX. Given the legislation change, we investigated whether cross-listed firms had set grant dates on a particular day of the week when the stock market is at its lowest level and avoided setting grants when the stock market is at its highest level. We argue that opportunistic managers may try to compensate for the reduction in reporting period by setting grant dates in harmony with the day-of-the-week effect. We tested the day-of-the-week based explanation as follows: First, we examined the day-of-the-week effect on the mean level of a large sample of the S&P/TSX Canadian return index, to determine the day on which Canadian market is likely to be low and the day on it is likely to be high. Second, we computed the percentage of grant dates for each of the week-days to see whether the highest percentage and lowest percentage of grant dates corresponds to the week-day on which the Canadian market tends to be at its lowest and highest levels, respectively.
The data consist of the daily returns for the S&P/TSX composite price index from the Toronto We employed univariate and multivariate analysis to examine the day-of-the-week effect in the Canadian market. In the univariate analysis, we started by testing for the homogeneity of variances across the days of a week. Then, based on Brown-Forsythe, we used the corresponding test to compare the mean of each day to the mean of each of the remaining days. The BrownForsythe test was developed to estimate whether more than two groups are homoscedastic. 10 In the multivariate analysis, we estimated the day-of-the-week effect with the following return model:
where R t is the daily return at time t, D is a constant term, and We estimated Equation (1) with a GARCH (p,q) type model. We chose the best GARCH (p,q) that fits the data series on the basis of Maximum Likelihood, AIC, and BIC criteria. Empirical studies estimating GARCH type models typically assume a normal error distribution (e.g. Hsieh, 1991; Bhattacharya, Sarkar, and Mukhopadhyay 2003, and Saadi, Gandhi, and Dutta, 2006) . However, financial time series have fatter tails. Therefore, we used the generalized error distribution (GED) proposed by Nelson (1991) that better fits financial time series. 12 Nelson recommends GED in order to capture the fat tails usually observed in the distribution of financial time series. For purposes of comparison, we report the estimations of GARCH (p, q) with a normal error distribution as well.
11 To proxy for the true but unobserved index returns, Stoll and Whaley (1990) use the residuals from an ARMA regression. Lo and Mackinlay (1990) show that non-synchronous trading causes a deviation of the observed index returns from the true index returns.
12 If a random variable X t has a GED with mean zero and unit variance, the probability density function of X t is given by:
where *( ) is the gamma function, X is a positive parameter governing the thickness of the tails of the distribution O is a constant given by
For X = 2 and constant O = 1, the GED is the standard normal distribution. Hamilton (1994) provides additional details about the generalized error distribution. Figure 1 displays the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from 30 days before through 30 days after option grant dates. Clearly, the average stock price begins to fall approximately 30 days before the grant dates; however, the stock price movement is reversed immediately after the grant date, starting an increase that lasts for at least 30 days after. The Vshaped pattern around the option grant date displayed in Figure 1 suggests that CEOs are granted stock options on the day when stock price is at its lowest level. Since the strike price of the option is often equal to the stock price at the grant date, CEOs receive stock options with a low VWULNHSULFHPDNLQJWKHRSWLRQVµLQ-the-PRQH\ ¶LPPHGLDWHO\DIWHUWKHJUDQWGDWH Table 2 presents statistically reliable evidence of negative cumulative abnormal returns before grant dates and positive cumulative abnormal returns afterwards. CARs for 30, 20, 10 and 5 days following (before) grant dates are positive (negative) and significantly different from zero at the 1% levels. For instance, the abnormal return is approximately 1.5% or 18% over the market return annualized during the 30-day periods after the option grant date. Although negative, CAR for one day before grant date is statistically insignificant. For robustness check, we repeated the event study using mean-adjusted returns instead of the market-adjusted returns, the results (not tabulated here) remain qualitatively similar.
The above findings suggest that opportunistic timing of stock option grants is not limited to U.S.
firms. It seems that borders do not matter when it comes to corporate wrong-doing. Our results show also that the Canadian regulations with respect to stock option grants did not discourage Canadian firms from engaging in opportunistic behavior. Hence, in contrast to the view of Canadian regulators, we should expect a high portion of Canadian firms involved in stock option grant manipulation. 
Testing the backdating explanation
The results reported in subsection (4.1) suggest some sort of manipulation of stock options granted to CEOs of Canadian public firms but do not explain the reasons behind this. As expressed earlier, the extant literature proposes three explanations: (1) opportunistic timing of option grants (Yermack, 1997) , (2) opportunistic timing of information disclosure (Aboody and Kaznik, 2000), and (3) backdating (Lie, 2005) . Recent studies, however, attribute the vast majority of stock returns scheduled around grant dates to backdating Lie, 2006, 2007) . Similar to Heron and Lie (2007) , we exploit a recent change in SEC reporting requirements to test the backdating explanation. We do so using a set of grants from Canadian public firms cross-listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Under the new reporting regime, firms will have to disclose stock option awards within two business days after the grant date. If backdating is the origin of excessive abnormal returns around option grants then we should document a significant reduction of excess return after the August 29, 2002. Before August 29, 2002, U.S.
fLUPVKDGWR UHSRUWRSWLRQJUDQWVZLWKLQGD\V DIWHUWKHFRPSDQ\ ¶VILVFDO \HDUHQGKRZHYHU
Canadian firms which are cross-listed in the U.S. have to report option grants within 10 calendar days after receiving the grant. With longer period to report, U.S. firms should be more tempted to involve into backdating practice than Canadian firms. Therefore, we should expect a less pronounced impact of the change in reporting requirement on stock returns pattern around grants in the Canadian context than in the American setting. Table 3 presents the cumulative abnormal returns for various periods around unscheduled stock options granted to CEOs of cross-listed firms before and after SOX. Column 3 shows the CARs before SOX. We note that, although negative, cumulative abnormal returns before the grant dates are not significantly different from zero. After the grant dates, however, CARs are positive and significant at the 5 % level, except from day +1 through day +5 where CAR is positive but not significant. CARs before SOX are evidence of stock option manipulation but we do not know whether backdating is the reason. The CARs after SOX, reported in Column 6, provide the answer. Interestingly, after SOX the positive CARs after grant date disappeared. Two important observations emerge from the results in Table 3 : First, evidence of stock option manipulation in cross-listed firms is due to backdating practice. Second, while SOX failed to eliminate backdating in U.S based firms, it succeeded to do so in Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S.
Besides the legal costs and investment-banking fees associated with U.S. listing, a firm has to endure the costs of SEC reporting and compliance requirements if it chooses to list its shares on
U.S. markets. Despite these costs Adjaoud and Ckhir (2004) document a steady increase in the percentage of public Canadian firms listing on U.S. markets. This trend, which started from early ¶V FRXOG EH H[SODLQHG E\ WKH SHUFHSWLRQ WKDW WKH FRVWV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK 86 OLVWLQJ DUH
smaller than the benefits that come with it: higher visibility, lower cost of capital, easier access to foreign capital markets and higher market value and stock liquidity (Mittoo, 1992; Fanto and Karmel, 1997; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004 ). Since our sample consists of the largest Canadian firms that are members of the S&P/TSX index, with 43% are cross-listed in the U.S., it will be interesting to examine the effect of SOX on domestic Canadian firms. Given the benefits associated with a potential listing on U.S. markets and the negative market reaction to the wave of corporate scandals in Canada and the U.S., we expect SOX to curb or at least lessen stock option grant manipulations by domestic Canadian firms. Table 4 reports CARs for various periods around unscheduled stock option granted to CEOs of domestic firms before and after SOX. Column 3 shows the CARs before SOX, while Column 6 presents the CARs after SOX. Several interesting observations emerge. Over the post-SOX period, CARs have the same overall pattern as CARs of cross-listed firms; positive and significant after grant dates but negative and insignificant before grant dates. After SOX, however, CARs of domestic firms become positive and insignificant after grant dates but negative and significant before grant dates, at 1% level. Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) To examine whether our results are driven by choice of the method of computing the abnormal returns, we repeated the event studies analysis using the mean-adjusted returns, the results remain qualitatively similar to the results obtained with market-adjusted returns. In this subsection we investigate whether, following the SOX, cross-listed firms set grant dates on a particular day of the week when the stock market is at its lowest level and avoid setting grants when the stock market is at its highest level. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics involving daily returns. The average daily return is lowest on Monday (which is the only day with a negative return) and highest on Friday. Daily returns typically increase each day from Monday to Friday. The daily returns are negatively skewed and fat-tailed, except for Monday when the estimated kurtosis is close to 3. An implication of these statistics is that the data series is non-normally distributed.
We used several commonly known tests to validate the initial observations from the statistics in Table 5 . We started by testing for the homogeneity or constancy of variances across the days of the week. Given that the statistics in Table 5 show a non-normal distribution of average daily returns, we used the Brown-Forsythe test, which is robust to departures from normality. The results from applying this test show an F-statistic equal to 4.479, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that the variance is the same across different days of the week.
Given results from Brown-Forsythe test, to compare the mean of each day to the means of remaining days, we used the Games-Howell test for multiple pair-wise comparisons. Unlike several other tests such as Bonferroni, the Games-Howell test does not assume homogeneity of variance. Table 6 provides the results from Games-Howell test. These results reject the null hypothesis that the daily mean return is constant over the week. Specifically, the Monday mean return differs from the Wednesday and Thursday mean returns at the 5% level and from the Friday mean return at the 1% level. Table 6 exhibits no significant differences between the Tuesday mean return and the return for any other day of the week.
Besides the univariate analysis, we employ regression analysis to identify the day with the lowest returns and the one with the highest returns. Table 7 reports results of the GARCH (1,1) under the normal error distribution. First, similar to the results from Table 6 , evidence from Table 7 supports the presence of the day-of-the-week effect with Monday having the lowest average return and Friday having the highest. When compared to the average return on Tuesday, the average return on Friday is 0.04% higher while that for Monday is 0.08% lower. The average return for Wednesday is 0.03% higher than for Tuesday, which differs significantly at the 10% level. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the average return for Thursday differs from Tuesday because the respective dummy variables are not statistically significant. To check robustness, we re-estimated the GARCH (1,1) assuming generalized error distribution (GED) as recommended by proposed by Nelson (1991) . The results presented in Table 7 are qualitative similar to those with normal error distribution.
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The results of the diagnostic tests show that all the GARCH models are correctly specified. The Ljung-Box statistics up to lag 50 could not reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.
Lagrange multiplier tests are also significant, indicating that the two GARCH processes are successful at modeling the conditional volatility. The sum of the parameters estimated by the 13 Since 43% of firms in our sample are also listed in the U.S. market, it is noteworthy that similar pattern of daily returns was reported for the U.S. as well (see for instance French, 1980; Bessembinder and Hertzel, 1993 and Siegel, 1998 T is also an estimation of the rate at which the response function decays on a daily basis. Since these rates are quite high, the response functions to shocks are likely to die slowly. Table 6 about here Table 7 about here In a nutshell, the descriptive statistics, Games-Howell test, and regression analysis all suggest the existence of a day-of-the-week effect with the highest average return on Friday and lowest average return on Monday. Therefore, if firms are deliberately setting stock option grants on days on which stock prices are low on average, we should observe more grants set on Mondays than on Fridays. Row two of Table 8 presents the distribution of all the grants over the weekdays. The results are consistent with our prediction. Indeed, 24.2% of grants are set on Mondays, while only 13.3% of grants are set on Fridays. It is noteworthy that the number of grants per week-day decreases steadily from its peak on Monday until it reaches its lowest level on Friday.
Nevertheless, if our reasoning holds, then we should observe more persistent day-of-the-weekconsistent distribution of grants after SOX than before SOX and this in particular for cross-listed firms. Table 8 presents the distribution of all the grants over the weekdays for domestic and cross-listed firms. Consistent with our prediction, the distribution of grants over the trading days is more consistent with day-of-the-week effect after SOX than before SOX. Moreover, the trend is more pronounced for cross-listed firms than for domestic firms. For instance, the proportions of grants occurring on Monday before SOX for domestic and cross-listed firms are 20.5% and 17.9%, respectively; however, after SOX the proportions of grants occurring on Monday are 22.4% and 27.8%, an increase of 9.3% for domestic firms and 55.3% for cross-listed firms.
Although the above results seem sound and coherent, they may suffer from a potential bias associated with the results of day-of-the-week effect reported in Tables 5, 6 , and 7. In fact, though the overall market is low on Monday and high on Friday, this may not be the case of each company taken individually. Nevertheless, the fact that all firms in our sample are members of the stock market index should lessen this concern. One way to test the robustness of our results is to find the percentage of grants that occur on the day where stock prices are the lowest during the same week and then compare them with the distribution of all the grants over the weekdays as reported in Table 8 . To do so, for each grant date, we collected the stock prices over the week in which the stock option was granted and compared them with the stock prices on the grant date.
The stock prices were collected from CFMRC data base. We associated a value of 1 if the stock price on the grant date was the lowest during the same week and 0 otherwise. The results for the whole sample are presented in Table 9 . We also partitioned our sample by domestic versus crosslisted firms as well as by before and after SOX. The results confirm our earlier prediction. In fact, the stock option grants are likely to be granted on a day where the price is at its lowest week level. This trend seems to be more persistent after SOX and in particular for cross-listed firms.
Indeed, the likelihood of a grant occurring on Monday increased from 24.49% before SOX to 29.17% after SOX for domestic firms while it increased from 21.82% to 29.41% for cross-listed firms. Interestingly, the likelihood of a grant occurring on the day with the lowest stock price during the week is consistent with the day-of-the-week effect: highest on Monday and lowest on Friday. Table 8 about here   Table 9 about here
Conclusions
The concerns over U.S. public firms manipulating CEOs ¶VWRFNRSWLRQJUDQWVKDYHVSUHDGRYHU Canadian markets. Nonetheless, while several papers investigated the U.S. market, no study has done so for the Canadian market. This paper fills this gap in the literature by investigating a sample of unscheduled stock options granted to CEOs of 196 large Canadian firms which are members of the S&P/TSX index. The Canadian context presents a special case to examine potential manipulation of stock options grants. Canadian and the U.S. regulations differ in some important aspects with respect to stock option awards and in several features of corporate governance as well. Our findings contribute to the extant literature in several ways. First, we find that the RSSRUWXQLVWLFWLPLQJRI&(2V ¶VWRFNRSWLRQJUDQWVLVQRWOLPLWHG to U.S. firms but it also prevalent in Canadian firms. Second, we find that most of the abnormal returns documented before and after grant dates are due to backdating practices. Third, we show that the introduction of the two-day filing requirement following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) has eliminated backdating practice by Canadian firms cross-listed in U.S. stock markets, although it did not do so for U.S. domestic firms as reported by Heron and Lie (2007) . Fourth, we find that SOX has altered the way Canadian domestic firms manipulate stock option grants. Fifth, we find that, following SOX, with only two business days to report grants, cross-listed firms seem to set stock option grants on the day with the lowest stock price over the same week.
Our overall results suggest that Canadian regulators should at the least adopt the SEC-initiated change and should also introduce new regulations that enhance the monitoring role of boards of directors. For instance, instead of recommending the independence of boards of directors, Canadian regulators should make independence of boards mandatory.
In this paper we have investigated stock options granted by the largest Canadian public firms.
However, smaller firms are more likely to engage in opportunistic timing of stock option grants since they are less followed by media and security analysts, which we refer to as size-effect. In fact, Atiase (1985) shows that the business press publishes fewer items for small firms than for large firms. Future research may also examine the size-effect. 
